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| 4 | <title>Missing Channel-Level Authorization in Shared Channel Invite/Uninvite API Allows Private Channel Data Exfiltration | Zion Boggan</title> |
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| 119 | border-radius:6px;padding:4px 10px;} |
| 120 | |
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| 123 | @media(max-width:680px){.cred{grid-template-columns:1fr;}} |
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| 126 | .cred .role b{color:var(--ink);font-weight:600;} |
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| 129 | display:flex;gap:10px;align-items:baseline;} |
| 130 | .certs li:first-child{border-top:none;} |
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| 132 | |
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| 136 | footer .note{color:var(--faint);font-size:12.5px;max-width:520px;} |
| 137 | |
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| 140 | .back:hover{color:var(--ink);} |
| 141 | .kicker{font-size:12px;letter-spacing:2px;text-transform:uppercase;color:var(--accent);margin-bottom:13px;font-family:ui-monospace,Menlo,monospace;} |
| 142 | .detail-hero h1{font-size:clamp(26px,4.6vw,38px);margin:0 0 12px;letter-spacing:-.5px;} |
| 143 | .detail-hero .tagline{font-size:clamp(15px,2vw,18px);color:var(--soft);max-width:800px;margin:0 0 16px;} |
| 144 | .facts{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(150px,1fr));gap:12px;margin-top:22px;} |
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| 147 | .content h2{font-size:13px;letter-spacing:2px;text-transform:uppercase;color:var(--muted);margin:42px 0 15px;font-weight:600;border-top:1px solid var(--line);padding-top:28px;} |
| 148 | .content h3{font-size:17px;margin:28px 0 10px;color:var(--ink);font-weight:600;} |
| 149 | .content h4{font-size:14px;margin:22px 0 8px;color:var(--soft);font-weight:600;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.5px;} |
| 150 | .content p{color:var(--soft);margin:0 0 15px;} |
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| 152 | .content li{margin:5px 0;} |
| 153 | .content strong{color:var(--ink);font-weight:600;} |
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| 155 | .content code{font-family:ui-monospace,Menlo,monospace;font-size:12.8px;background:var(--panel2);border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:4px;padding:1px 5px;color:var(--soft);} |
| 156 | .content pre{background:var(--bg2);border:1px solid var(--line2);border-radius:10px;padding:15px 18px;overflow-x:auto;margin:0 0 18px;} |
| 157 | .content pre code{background:none;border:none;padding:0;font-size:12.4px;color:var(--soft);line-height:1.6;white-space:pre;} |
| 158 | .content table{width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;margin:2px 0 20px;font-size:13.3px;} |
| 159 | .content th{text-align:left;color:var(--muted);font-weight:600;border-bottom:1px solid var(--line2);padding:9px 12px;font-size:11px;letter-spacing:.6px;text-transform:uppercase;} |
| 160 | .content td{color:var(--soft);border-bottom:1px solid var(--line);padding:9px 12px;vertical-align:top;} |
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| 162 | .content hr{border:none;border-top:1px solid var(--line);margin:30px 0;} |
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| 164 | .nbgroup{margin:40px 0 0;} |
| 165 | .nbgroup h2{font-size:13px;letter-spacing:2px;text-transform:uppercase;color:var(--accent);margin:0 0 4px;font-weight:600;} |
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| 167 | .nbtable{width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;font-size:14px;border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:12px;overflow:hidden;} |
| 168 | .nbtable tr{border-top:1px solid var(--line);} |
| 169 | .nbtable tr:first-child{border-top:none;} |
| 170 | .nbtable tr:hover{background:var(--panel);} |
| 171 | .nbtable td{padding:14px 16px;vertical-align:top;} |
| 172 | .nbtable .cls{white-space:nowrap;color:var(--accent);font-family:ui-monospace,Menlo,monospace;font-size:11.5px;text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.5px;width:150px;} |
| 173 | .nbtable .ti a{font-weight:600;color:var(--ink);} |
| 174 | .nbtable .ti a:hover{color:var(--accent);} |
| 175 | .nbtable .ol{color:var(--muted);font-size:13px;margin-top:3px;} |
| 176 | @media(max-width:680px){.nbtable .cls{width:auto;display:block;}} |
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| 199 | <div class="kicker">Authz bypass</div> |
| 200 | <h1>Missing Channel-Level Authorization in Shared Channel Invite/Uninvite API Allows Private Channel Data Exfiltration</h1> |
| 201 | </div></header> |
| 202 | <section><div class="wrap"><div class="content"> |
| 203 | <p><strong>Severity:</strong> High |
| 204 | <strong>CVSS Score:</strong> 7.7 |
| 205 | <strong>CWE:</strong> CWE-862 |
| 206 | <strong>Type:</strong> Broken Access Control (Authorization Bypass) |
| 207 | <strong>URL:</strong> <code>POST /api/v4/remotecluster/{remote_id}/channels/{channel_id}/invite</code></p> |
| 208 | <h2>Summary</h2> |
| 209 | <p>The <code>inviteRemoteClusterToChannel</code> and <code>uninviteRemoteClusterToChannel</code> API endpoints in <code>server/channels/api4/shared_channel.go</code> only enforce system-level <code>manage_shared_channels</code> permission via <code>RequirePermissionToManageSharedChannels()</code> (line 153/204). They do <strong>not</strong> verify that the calling user has channel-level access (<code>SessionHasPermissionToChannel</code>) to the target channel.</p> |
| 210 | <p>This allows any user who holds the <code>manage_shared_channels</code> permission (granted via the <code>SharedChannelManager</code> role, which is a non-sysadmin role) to invite a remote cluster to <strong>any private channel on the instance</strong>, including channels they are not a member of and cannot read. Once invited, the remote cluster receives full message synchronization for that channel, effectively exfiltrating all private channel content to an attacker-controlled server.</p> |
| 211 | <p>This is the same bug class as CVE-2025-11777 (authorization scope mismatch), where a system/team-level permission check was used instead of a channel-level check.</p> |
| 212 | <p><strong>Inconsistency proof:</strong> In the same file, <code>getSharedChannelRemotes</code> (line 265) correctly calls <code>SessionHasPermissionToChannel(c.AppContext, *c.AppContext.Session(), c.Params.ChannelId, model.PermissionReadChannel)</code> before returning data. The invite/uninvite endpoints lack this check entirely.</p> |
| 213 | <p><strong>The gap exists across the entire call chain:</strong> |
| 214 | - API layer: <code>api4/shared_channel.go:153</code>, system-level only |
| 215 | - App layer: <code>app/shared_channel.go:113</code>, zero authorization, passthrough |
| 216 | - Plugin API: <code>plugin_api.go:1504</code>, zero authorization, any plugin can invoke |
| 217 | - Service layer: <code>service_api.go:113</code>, zero authorization, will even auto-share a previously unshared channel via <code>shareIfNotShared=true</code></p> |
| 218 | <h2>Reproduction Steps</h2> |
| 219 | <ol> |
| 220 | <li> |
| 221 | <ol> |
| 222 | <li>Deploy Mattermost with shared channels enabled (ExperimentalSettings.EnableSharedChannels=true, EnableRemoteClusterService=true) and at least one registered remote cluster.</li> |
| 223 | </ol> |
| 224 | </li> |
| 225 | <li> |
| 226 | <ol start="2"> |
| 227 | <li>As system admin, create a team and a PRIVATE channel. Post confidential data in the private channel.</li> |
| 228 | </ol> |
| 229 | </li> |
| 230 | <li> |
| 231 | <ol start="3"> |
| 232 | <li>Create a second user (attacker). Add attacker to the team but NOT to the private channel.</li> |
| 233 | </ol> |
| 234 | </li> |
| 235 | <li> |
| 236 | <ol start="4"> |
| 237 | <li>Verify attacker CANNOT read the private channel: GET /api/v4/channels/{private_channel_id}/posts returns HTTP 403.</li> |
| 238 | </ol> |
| 239 | </li> |
| 240 | <li> |
| 241 | <ol start="5"> |
| 242 | <li>Grant the attacker the manage_shared_channels permission, either by assigning the SharedChannelManager role or adding the permission to their existing role.</li> |
| 243 | </ol> |
| 244 | </li> |
| 245 | <li> |
| 246 | <ol start="6"> |
| 247 | <li>Re-authenticate as the attacker (new session to pick up permissions).</li> |
| 248 | </ol> |
| 249 | </li> |
| 250 | <li> |
| 251 | <ol start="7"> |
| 252 | <li>Verify attacker STILL cannot read the private channel: GET /api/v4/channels/{private_channel_id}/posts returns HTTP 403.</li> |
| 253 | </ol> |
| 254 | </li> |
| 255 | <li> |
| 256 | <ol start="8"> |
| 257 | <li>As attacker, invite a remote cluster to the private channel: POST /api/v4/remotecluster/{remote_id}/channels/{private_channel_id}/invite</li> |
| 258 | </ol> |
| 259 | </li> |
| 260 | <li> |
| 261 | <ol start="9"> |
| 262 | <li>Observe the request does NOT return 403. It either succeeds (200) or fails at a downstream step (400 invalid remote, 501 service not running), proving the channel-level permission check is missing.</li> |
| 263 | </ol> |
| 264 | </li> |
| 265 | <li> |
| 266 | <ol start="10"> |
| 267 | <li>If a valid remote cluster ID is used: the private channel becomes shared and its messages sync to the remote cluster, exfiltrating confidential data.</li> |
| 268 | </ol> |
| 269 | </li> |
| 270 | </ol> |
| 271 | <pre><code class="language-bash">curl -X POST "https://TARGET/api/v4/remotecluster/REMOTE_CLUSTER_ID/channels/PRIVATE_CHANNEL_ID/invite" \ |
| 272 | -H "Authorization: Bearer SHARED_CHANNEL_MANAGER_TOKEN" \ |
| 273 | -H "Content-Type: application/json" |
| 274 | </code></pre> |
| 275 | <h2>Evidence</h2> |
| 276 | <pre><code>**Docker verification on mattermost-preview:latest (v11.5.1):** |
| 277 | |
| 278 | Differential test - same endpoint, same private channel (created by user2, not accessible to either test user): |
| 279 | |
| 280 | </code></pre> |
| 281 | <p>Admin (has manage_shared_channels via system_admin): |
| 282 | POST /api/v4/remotecluster/aaaabbbb…/channels/{private_channel_id}/invite |
| 283 | => HTTP 501: “The remote cluster service is not enabled.” |
| 284 | (PASSED auth check at line 153, reached GetRemoteClusterService at line 159)</p> |
| 285 | <p>Regular user (no manage_shared_channels): |
| 286 | POST /api/v4/remotecluster/aaaabbbb…/channels/{private_channel_id}/invite |
| 287 | => HTTP 403: “You do not have the appropriate permissions.” |
| 288 | (BLOCKED at RequirePermissionToManageSharedChannels at line 153)</p> |
| 289 | <pre><code> |
| 290 | The 501 vs 403 differential proves the **only** authorization gate is the system-level `ManageSharedChannels` permission. No channel-level check (`SessionHasPermissionToChannel`) exists anywhere in the invite flow. On a production instance with the remote cluster service fully configured, the request would proceed to share the private channel. |
| 291 | |
| 292 | **Source code proof (GitHub HEAD):** |
| 293 | |
| 294 | ```go |
| 295 | // api4/shared_channel.go:142 - VULNERABLE |
| 296 | func inviteRemoteClusterToChannel(c *Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 297 | c.RequireRemoteId() |
| 298 | c.RequireChannelId() |
| 299 | c.RequirePermissionToManageSharedChannels() // Line 153: system-level ONLY |
| 300 | // MISSING: c.App.SessionHasPermissionToChannel(... c.Params.ChannelId, model.PermissionReadChannel) |
| 301 | ... |
| 302 | c.App.InviteRemoteToChannel(c.Params.ChannelId, c.Params.RemoteId, ...) // Line 180 |
| 303 | } |
| 304 | |
| 305 | // web/context.go:837 - confirms system scope |
| 306 | func (c *Context) RequirePermissionToManageSharedChannels() *Context { |
| 307 | if !c.App.SessionHasPermissionTo(*c.AppContext.Session(), model.PermissionManageSharedChannels) { |
| 308 | c.SetPermissionError(model.PermissionManageSharedChannels) |
| 309 | } |
| 310 | return c |
| 311 | } |
| 312 | |
| 313 | // api4/shared_channel.go:265 - SECURE (same file, inconsistent) |
| 314 | func getSharedChannelRemotes(c *Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { |
| 315 | if ok, _ := c.App.SessionHasPermissionToChannel(c.AppContext, *c.AppContext.Session(), |
| 316 | c.Params.ChannelId, model.PermissionReadChannel); !ok { |
| 317 | c.SetPermissionError(model.PermissionReadChannel) // HAS channel check |
| 318 | return |
| 319 | } |
| 320 | } |
| 321 | </code></pre> |
| 322 | <pre><code> |
| 323 | ## Impact |
| 324 | |
| 325 | **Confidentiality: HIGH** - An attacker with `SharedChannelManager` role (non-sysadmin) can exfiltrate all messages from any private channel on the instance by inviting their controlled remote cluster to it. This includes: |
| 326 | - Private channel message history (full sync) |
| 327 | - File attachments shared in the channel |
| 328 | - User metadata of channel members |
| 329 | - Ongoing real-time message sync |
| 330 | |
| 331 | **Integrity: MEDIUM** - The attacker could also uninvite legitimate remotes from shared channels (via the uninvite endpoint with the same missing check), disrupting authorized cross-cluster collaboration. |
| 332 | |
| 333 | **Additional attack surface:** The Plugin API (`PluginAPI.InviteRemoteToChannel` at plugin_api.go:1504) performs zero authorization checks. Any installed plugin can share any channel with any remote without any permission validation, extending this vulnerability to plugin-based attacks. |
| 334 | |
| 335 | **Scope escalation:** The `shareIfNotShared=true` parameter (passed by the API handler) causes the service layer to auto-share a previously unshared private channel before inviting the remote - silently converting a channel that was never intended to be shared. |
| 336 | |
| 337 | ## Root Cause |
| 338 | |
| 339 | Authorization scope mismatch. The `RequirePermissionToManageSharedChannels()` function (web/context.go:842) calls `SessionHasPermissionTo()` which is a **system-level** permission check. It verifies the user holds the `manage_shared_channels` permission globally, but does not verify the user has any access to the specific channel being shared. |
| 340 | |
| 341 | The correct fix requires adding a channel-level check - `SessionHasPermissionToChannel(channelId, PermissionReadChannel)` - before proceeding with the invite, consistent with how `getSharedChannelRemotes` (line 265 in the same file) already checks channel access. |
| 342 | |
| 343 | The `ManageSharedChannels` permission is defined with `PermissionScopeSystem` (model/permission.go:836), which is architecturally correct for controlling who can manage shared channels in general. But the invite/uninvite endpoints need an **additional** channel-scoped check to enforce that the user can only share channels they have access to. |
| 344 | |
| 345 | ## Suggested Fix |
| 346 | |
| 347 | Add `SessionHasPermissionToChannel` check in both `inviteRemoteClusterToChannel` and `uninviteRemoteClusterToChannel` handlers, after the existing `RequirePermissionToManageSharedChannels` check: |
| 348 | |
| 349 | ```go |
| 350 | // api4/shared_channel.go - inviteRemoteClusterToChannel (after line 156) |
| 351 | if ok, _ := c.App.SessionHasPermissionToChannel(c.AppContext, *c.AppContext.Session(), |
| 352 | c.Params.ChannelId, model.PermissionReadChannel); !ok { |
| 353 | c.SetPermissionError(model.PermissionReadChannel) |
| 354 | return |
| 355 | } |
| 356 | </code></pre> |
| 357 | <p>Apply the same fix to: |
| 358 | 1. <code>uninviteRemoteClusterToChannel</code> (after line 207) |
| 359 | 2. <code>PluginAPI.InviteRemoteToChannel</code> (plugin_api.go:1504), add channel membership validation |
| 360 | 3. <code>PluginAPI.UninviteRemoteFromChannel</code> (plugin_api.go:1508), same |
| 361 | 4. The <code>/share invite</code> slash command handler (command_share.go), already implicitly scoped to current channel but should be explicitly validated</p> |
| 362 | <hr><p style="color:var(--faint);font-size:12.5px;font-family:ui-monospace,Menlo,monospace">Source · github.com/zionboggan/security-research-notebook · writeups/grafana/mattermost-shared-channel-authz-bypass.md</p> |
| 363 | </div></div></section> |
| 364 | <footer><div class="wrap row"> |
| 365 | <div class="links"><a href="/">Portfolio</a><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/zion-boggan">LinkedIn</a><a href="/security-research-notebook/">Notebook</a><a href="mailto:zionboggan0@gmail.com">Email</a></div> |
| 366 | <div class="note">Coordinated-disclosure research. Findings appear here only after the program's disclosure window closed, the patch shipped, or a CVE was published. No customer data was accessed.</div> |
| 367 | </div></footer> |
| 368 | </body></html> |